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INTERNATIONAL 
CARD GAME 
A r 
^ r The issue of 
bank credit card 
regulation is yet 
to be solved. 
Federal Reserve Board 
member Andrew Brimmer 
says the cards 
may one day be 
regulated to prevent 
monopolistic 
practices. 
;
 V 
Bank cards 
have yet to get a 
strong foothold 
in what's probably 
the biggest segment 
of the retail market: 
the department 
store 
r 
J K 
The alleged imminence 
of the Checkless Society 
had many people bewildered. 
Elderly widows were 
writing to local 
newspaper columnists, 
inquiring how they 
could live once banks 
stopped issuing checks. 
USA 
It wasn't long ago that people began talking excitedly 
about the impending revolution in money. Currency, they 
said, would go the way of greenbacks and wampum; 
most cash and check transactions would be replaced by 
electronic, computerized blips. They proclaimed us on 
the verge of the "Checkless, Cashless Society." 
More recently, however, bankers and systems experts* 
have amended the prediction, calling it instead the "/ess-
check, /ess-cash society"; drastic changes in the finan-
cial system, it now appears, are apt to come about more 
gradually than had previously been predicted. 
Indeed, the Federal Reserve Board reports that the 
percentage of cash transactions in this country has de-
clined, while the accelerated pace of check-usage has 
yet to be slowed. (Check volume is expected to double 
in the next decade.) 
One reason for the decline, of course, is that more and 
more consumers (an estimated 50%) are purchasing on 
credit, putting to use any one of perhaps as many as a 
dozen of their shiny new plastic credit cards. This year, 
more than $2 billion in retail sales will be charged to 
bank credit cards alone, up from $500 million only five 
years ago. 
Thus the impending revolution in money has, for the 
time being, become a credit card revolution. Some bank-
ers viewed credit cards as a first step toward a total 
electronic money system: An opportunity to develop the 
necessary lines of credit between bankers, merchants 
and consumers. Besides, at about this time, 1965, Bank 
of America was finding it a profitable operation (it now 
* Touche Ross & Co. started work on a System for Automatic 
Value Exchange (called SAVE) back in 1962 and presented the 
concept for long-range consideration at the Bank Presidents' 
Conference, January 31,1966. 
accounts for an estimated 5% of net income) and was 
winning some new customers. 
The Beginning 
Bank credit cards had actually been in use to a limited 
extent for some time. Back in the early Fifties, starting in 
1951 with the Franklin National Bank in Franklin Square, 
Long Island, more than 100 banks (primarily small, local 
institutions) entered the field. But the costs of process-
ing a necessarily limited number of accounts in that pre-
computer era were too high. Few found the new business 
lucrative, and most dropped out altogether. By 1955 
there were fewer than half a million cardholders; pur-
chases amounted to less than $100 million. 
The industry lost interest, and it wasn't until later in 
the decade that big banks entered the picture. But then, 
too, the results were disappointing. The First National 
Bank and Northwestern National Bank, both of Minne-
apolis, and New York's Chase Manhattan failed totally 
in their efforts. The Twin City banks and Chase dropped 
or sold their operations in 1960 and 1962 respectively, in 
the wake of rumors of enormous charge card losses. 
Bank of America, Georgia's Citizens & Southern, and 
New York's Marine Midland Trust were willing to sub-
sidize their budding service. 
1965. Enter the "third generation" computers. They 
drastically reduced the costs of operating a bank card 
system and radically increased its capacity to handle 
accounts. In 1965, the industry showed some real growth. 
A number of major banks entered the field (including two 
in Pittsburgh, Mellon National and Pittsburgh National, 
and Valley National of Phoenix), and the following year 
four San Francisco-based banks banded together to 
compete with the thriving BankAmericard. It was the 
start of the second major national bank card—Master 
Charge. The new organization, the California Bankcard 
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Assn., adopted the "Master Charge" label for its cards, 
and by 1967, more than 70 banks had joined. The B of A 
retaliated with its nationwide franchising campaign— 
and the credit card race was on. 
Fraud on Credit 
The going was rough at first; start-up costs were fre-
quently higher than expected. The biggest hurdle in 
establishing a new credit card was to get it quickly and 
widely distributed; retailers were reluctant to sign up 
with a program unless there were enough cardholders 
to increase sales. Consequently, a number of banks 
launched their plans with mass—and frequently indis-
criminate—mailings of credit cards. In some cases there 
were tremendous credit and fraud losses. 
In 1966, a group of Chicago banks, eager to get a 
jump on BankAmericard, inundated the city with five mil-
lion cards— just in time for the Christmas shopping rush. 
Although bank officials claimed the mailing lists had 
been properly screened, the press was full of stories 
which indicated otherwise: The cardholder who turned 
out to be a child of two; the card that was sent to a long-
deceased grandmother. One Chicagoan reportedly was 
mailed 14 cards from four different banks—one of which 
had been sent to an address he had left ten years before. 
Now fraud became a major problem, and some of the 
banks suffered huge losses—accounting for as much as 
5% of billings. Three of the banks recalled all their cards, 
pared their mailing lists and sent out new cards by regis-
tered mail. 
The* incident focussed attention on the obvious prob-
lems facing bank card operations and prompted a flurry 
of activity. Representative Wright Patman, Chairman of 
the House Committee on Banking and Currency, intro-
duced a bill to ban unsolicited cards and to limit the 
amount that could be charged to any card. Senator 
William Proxmire of the Senate Banking Committee and 
Representative Joseph Karth introduced bills with simi-
lar intent. Some of the savings-and-loan people jumped 
on the bandwagon, chiding the banking industry for its 
indiscretions. The Talman Federal Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation took out a two-page advertisement in the Chi-
cago newspapers as a "public service to all thrifty 
people" to explain "how to use bank charge cards." It 
warned of "the harm it could do to young, struggling 
families," unaware of a charge plan's interest rates (fre-
quently 11/2% per month; 18% for the entire year). 
But the bankers were not deterred. Most banks either 
hurried to sign up with B of A or got out their own cards 
in self-defense. Many began banding together into re-
gional organizations to give their local or statewide 
cards broader range and to share the costs of entering 
the field. In 1968 the California Bankcard Assn. joined 
with five other state-wide organizations to form Western 
States Bankcard Assn., thus spreading the Master 
Charge name and expanding its charge privileges. (Simi-
lar groups were also formed in the East, South and 
Southwest and New England. Some obtained Master 
Charge licenses from WSBA.) 
The Lineup 
By the end of 1966, BankAmericard was fast gaining 
the reach of a nationwide credit card—a major selling 
point in the mad scramble for potential cardholders and 
merchants. Non-BankAmericard banks responded to the 
challenge with the Interbank Card Assn. Set up in No-
vember 1966, the Association serves as a clearing house, 
interchanging the charge privileges of its members. It 
in effect transformed all of its card-issuing, member or-
ganizations—local, state and regional—into nationwide 
charge accounts. With six million cardholders, 131,000 
merchants after its first year in operation, Interbank has 
since mushroomed to more than three times that size— 
at last count in June of this year, over 20 million card-
holders, 400,000 merchants in 49 states. An Interbank 
card (identifiable by the encircled " i " on the front of a 
bank credit card) may also be used in 44 countries 
abroad. Master Charge has become the most widely-
held Interbank card; this year, the Association acquired 
the franchise from WSBA. 
Now, BankAmericard and Interbank are about equal 
in size. By year's end, both will have an estimated total 
of 50 million cardholders, charging an estimated $2 bil-
lion worth of goods and services. But though these are 
way beyond the originally projected figures, the two sys-
tems are leaving nothing to chance. Both will be carrying 
on extensive advertising campaigns in the coming 
months: Interbank is preparing its first national broad-
casting program this winter at a cost of $1.2 million; 
BankAmericard will present Herb Alpert and his band 
in an October television special. 
Roses from the Fed 
The success of the bank cards is due at least as much 
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to the Federal Reserve Board as it is to the impetus of 
the B of A. In 1967 the Fed urged Congress to await a 
Board study before considering passage of the proposed 
restrictive legislation. The following year the Board 
issued a report that found credit cards a "natural exten-
sion" of banking and that regulatory legislation was 
neither necessary nor desirable. Bankers were urged to 
screen their mailing lists more carefully, but the report 
concluded that mass mailings of cards "seems to be" 
the best way of getting into the business. It was noted 
that many banks had, after the major problems that oc-
curred in Chicago, developed sound card programs by 
conducting extensive market research—or "feasibility" 
—studies "to uncover problems and determine profit 
potential." 
Indeed, reports of fraud and general mismanagement 
of bank card operations have declined sharply. To en-
sure themselves a profit-making venture, many banks 
have engaged management consultants—first to deter-
mine market potential and then to plan and install the 
systems, procedures and marketing campaigns that are 
necessary to implement an entire bank card program. 
And some banks that left the credit card business have 
returned—Chase Manhattan, for instance, bought back 
Unicard last year for a reported $50 million after having 
sold it in 1962 for $9 million. 
The impact these cards will have upon the economy is 
not yet known. The 1968 Federal Reserve report, which 
mi\m 
Now, bank cards are fast becoming an international 
phenomenon as well—as common a sight as TV, Coca-
Cola or a transistor radio. 
Foreign banks started getting into the bank card busi-
ness in the mid-Sixties, and again the B of A was a moti-
vating force. Some foreign bankers, fearful of losing 
their independence, have declined BankAmericard li-
censes and opted for cards of their own, instead. So far, 
dozens have entered the field, in Europe, Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. 
The bankers are not going it alone entirely, however. 
Nearly every foreign card is interchangeable with one 
of the two American giants—Interbank or BankAmeri-
card. And several are relying upon American advice to 
steer them clear of the pitfalls experienced back in the 
was based upon 1967 statistics, found the cards had had 
no discernible adverse effect upon the general welfare 
of the economy—upon prices, buying habits, or the in-
flationary trend. Any future impact, the study concluded, 
would be felt only gradually. 
Courting the Consumer 
Whether the bank cards will eventually drive out the 
travel and entertainment cards—American Express, 
Diners' Club and Carte Blanche—is another matter. As 
the two dominant bank card systems continue expand-
ing their charge privileges (particularly into the standard 
cards' traditional marketplace, hotels, restaurants and 
travel) they seem to pose an ever greater threat to the 
commercial card companies. However, all three compa-
nies are fighting back vigorously, expanding their serv-
ices and extending more credit. Diners' Club has gone 
into a broad range of travel services through its Fugazy 
Travel Bureau acquisition, the third largest travel organi-
zation in the world. American Express is hedging its bet 
with its Fund American Companies acquisition. Fund 
American (formerly Firemen's Fund Insurance) is parent 
company for the sixth largest insurance group in the 
country. 
Thus, the outcome of the credit card war is by no 
means certain. But whatever the result, one thing is 
assured: With five giant forces competing for his favors, 
the American consumer cannot lose. 
early days of bank cards in this country. 
In Mexico, a defensive move against the B of A in 1966 
led Banco Nacional de Mexico—that country's biggest 
bank—to plunge into the card business on its own. Now 
the operation—Banc-O-Matico—has 120,000 cardhold-
ers and 12,000 merchants to its credit, but the bank is 
thinking about an eventual merger with a new, rival card, 
Carnet. 
In the following interview, Ronald Coleman, a partner 
of the Touche Ross Mexico City office, discusses with 
TEMPO'S Janet Smith the growth of bank credit cards in 
Mexico. The firm was engaged by a group of five Mexico 
City banks to study the feasibility of a new Mexican bank 
credit card. Mr. Coleman prepared the entensive study 
and then helped implement the proposed system. A cen-
tral processing and service organization, Promocion y 
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Operacion, was formed to operate the new card, Carnet 
(now more than ten banks strong), just launched on 
August 22nd of this year. 
Mexican bank cards got a later start. Were they able to 
benefit from U. S. experience? 
The Mexican banking community has by and large 
duplicated the pattern of development that occurred in 
the States. That is, in 1967 Banco Nacional entered the 
market, developed their own systems and policies, and 
as a result had to make a series of rather expensive 
changes as they became more knowledgeable about the 
business. Then some of the smaller banks felt 'that for 
defensive reasons they had to get together and go into a 
competing credit card system, and they called on man-
agement consultants for assistance. The same thing 
happened in the States. American bankers didn't begin 
calling on outsiders for help until they saw the problems 
encountered by the earlier entries. 
Fraud was the major problem here in the States. Is that 
the main problem down there right now? 
No. But we expect it's going to be. Right now the crim-
inal element has not yet realized that a credit card is 
near-cash. Also, Mexican bankers are not going to mass 
mail their cards, at least initially, and this was a major 
cause of the fraud problem in the States. In addition, the 
Mexican banking authorities have placed certain restric-
tions on the source and amount of bank funds which can 
be used to support credit card charges. This means that 
the number of cards which can be issued, particularly 
for the smaller banks, will be restricted and hence more 
stringent controls can be employed. 
Then the real problem is a limited market? 
Yes—that's the major problem in terms of profitability. 
The banks—because of the limits on credit extension— 
restrict the cards to their prime customers—those with 
an income of $400 a month or more. There are only about 
350,000 people in Mexico with this kind of income, and 
only 250,000 will probably end up using a credit card. 
So everybody [the B of A finally obtained a licensee in 
Mexico this year] is sending cards out to these same 
250,000 people, and they're just cutting up the market 
smaller and smaller. The number of cards that the econ-
omy can actually support is much higher than the 
amount that are presently being distributed. I might add 
that the natural conservatism of bankers also dictates 
a cautious approach to marketing this new service. 
There are also other problems you'd have in any de-
veloping country. For instance, if you're going to expand 
your market, you're going to be sending cards out to 
people with less money to spend, who have less experi-
ence in terms of controlling their own finances. That 
means you've got to extend your controls—lower your 
purchase limits and increase security measures. And in 
order to do that, you've got to put in a better communi-
cations system. Which means you've got to have more 
dependable telephone lines—the merchant has to have 
some way to communicate all this data to the bank. You 
also need a good centralized credit bureau so that if a 
cardholder doesn't make his card payments, he knows 
he'll have to live with it, because the information will be 
going into a credit bureau some place. You need all 
these things if you're going to expand your system to 
the middle class, and you've got to expand it to the mid-
dle class if you're going to achieve high volume and, 
hence, profits. 
It doesn't sound as if the Mexican credit card business is 
too profitable. 
Relatively speaking, the bank card systems in Mexico 
could be a much bigger profit generator than they have 
been in the U. S. The cost of people is 30% of what it is 
in the U. S., the cost of goods and services is as high, and 
the merchant discount rate is 2 to 3 times as high (the 
cost of money in Mexico runs almost double the cost in 
the States). Banc-O-Matico will probably break even 
their third or fourth year out, and that's about on a par 
with U. S. bank cards. 
What can management consultants do to improve this 
record? 
We feel we've made a substantial contribution to the 
efficient implementation and operation of our client's 
system. We estimate that our operating expenses will 
be 75%-80% of that of our major competitors. We will 
be using our computer IV2 to 2 hours per day versus 
3 to 4 hours for a competing bank card system. Our in-
ternal controls should enable us to detect occurrences of 
fraud and bad debts more quickly; one of our competi-
tors does merchant discount calculations by hand, with 
no later verification either by computer or by internal 
office personnel. There's no way of determining if their 
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merchant discount income is correct. 
An extremely important area is merchant servicing. 
We will be giving merchants immediate credit, at par 
value, for their deposits, and we will charge the mer-
chant discount to their checking account at one time 
at the end of the month. It takes some of our competitors 
20-30 days to give a merchant credit for his deposits, 
particularly outside Mexico City. As a result, many mer-
chants now offer a 10% discount if a customer pays in 
cash instead of using a credit card; we estimate that 
approximately 20% of possible sales outside of Mexico 
City are lost because of poor service to the merchant. 
There have been many other inefficiencies as well— 
a computer was installed for one year and never used, 
plastic cards and sales slips have been redesigned sev-
eral times. I could go on and on. 
Will the limited number of cardholders tend to heighten 
competition among the banks? 
No. Actually, we've signed a letter of agreement with 
Banco Nacional to use their merchant outlets and 
charge merchants the same discount rate. [Merchants 
discount their sales slips with the bank.] In the States, 
each bank has to sign up his own merchants and can't 
reveal his merchant discount rate. But in Mexico, we're 
Mfflffl 
Canadians have generally regarded credit cards in 
much the same way they have looked upon used car 
dealers—i.e., with a good deal of suspicion. Buying on 
credit was as distasteful to them as it had been to a 
previous generation of Americans. But last year, im-
pressed by the success of their U. S. counterparts, four 
of the six major Canadian banks—the Royal Bank, the 
Toronto-Dominion Bank, la Banque Canadienne Na-
tionale and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce— 
decided to join forces to set up a new bank credit card. 
While each of the four banks decided to issue its own 
Chargex card and sign up its own cardholders and mer-
chants, all share the costs of advertising, promotion and 
merchant sign-ups. It was an immediate success. The 
new system, called Chargex, already has about 11/2 mil-
lion cardholders and is accepted by 20,000 merchants 
located primarily around Toronto and Montreal.'Al-
though the banks are confident Chargex will be in use 
not prevented legally from working together. We said 
OK, because it gave us the opportunity of getting a large 
number of outlets quickly, and we didn't want to start a 
discount war—nobody gains from that. It also gives us a 
chance to see how the other system operates, as a basis 
for merging sometime in the future. 
How would a merger increase the profitability of bank 
cards? 
In a bank credit card operation, 80%-90% of the costs 
for the first year are fixed. Each of our five banks of 
varying sizes will pay for the cost of operating a bank 
card system during the first year on the basis of their 
asset size. So if one bank has 20% of the total assets 
of all the banks, they're going to pay 20% of the oper-
ating expenses. Our operating expenses for the first 
year will be approximately $1 million. Banco Nacional 
is about as large itself as the total of our ten member 
banks. So if they join our system, that means they are 
going to pay 50% of the cost of the operation. It would 
reduce their cost of operating by 50% or more. My 
forecast is that two years from now there'll be two bank 
credit card systems in Mexico—Banco de Comercial 
[B of A] and our group, Garnet, which is affiliated with 
the Interbank Card Assn. 
in every province by 1971, the card is already inter-
changeable with BankAmericard and with cards issued 
by Sumitomo Bank in Japan, Banco Comercial in Mexico 
and London's Barclays Bank. 
Why is Chargex a success? "We've been able to buy 
ten years' experience from the B of A and avoid a lot of 
mistakes that they made," explains Jack Allanach, 
Chargex' director of PR. Another reason, says Allanach, 
is that "Banks are about the closest thing you're going to 
find to churches in this country. Our banks have always 
been very solid, and the people have tremendous con-
fidence in them. A private company in Quebec tried to 
get into the business last year after Chargex came out, 
but it failed—Canadians feel they can trust the banks in 
this country, but a private finance company is open to 
suspicion." 
Although the Canadian bankers aren't revealing sales 
or earnings figures for their year-old credit card, they're 
all predicting big profits for the future. 
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